MICRA in 2026: what the AB 35 caps mean when you commission a medical expert

For nearly fifty years the figure did not move, which made it a fixed background condition rather than something to be checked. Assembly Bill 35, enacted in 2022 and operative from 1 January 2023, changed that in a way that requires active attention: as enacted, the tiers began at $350,000 and $500,000 and rise each 1 January — by $40,000 for the injury tier and $50,000 for the wrongful death tier — until 2033, when the statute sets them at $750,000 and $1,000,000. Thereafter the statute provides for an annual adjustment.

For matters in 2026 the figures reached by that schedule are $470,000 and $650,000.

Those numbers are the schedule's arithmetic, not a determination about any matter. Which tier applies, whether the cap applies at all, how it interacts with economic damages, and how multiple defendants or claimants affect it are questions of law for counsel — and the statute is subject to amendment. Confirm the current provision before relying on any figure.

This is an uncomfortable observation for an expert practice to make in writing, and it is made deliberately. The alternative — quoting for every discipline a matter could conceivably use — is worse for the client and worse for the practice, because a case that spends its value on expert fees does not come back.

The useful version of the conversation identifies which single discipline the matter actually turns on. Most medical negligence cases have one: a standard-of-care question, or a causation question, or a damages question. The other two are frequently supporting rather than load-bearing, and supporting opinions can often be deferred until the load-bearing one has held up.

None of this is advice about the value of a claim, which is counsel's assessment and not ours. It is an observation about sequencing expert spend.

The practical consequence is that the economic side of a case can carry disproportionate weight in California, and the disciplines that establish it — vocational and economic loss analysis, life-care planning, forensic accounting where a business or a practice is affected — often justify investment that the noneconomic side would not.

That is close to the reverse of the calculus in Oregon, where the statutory limit on noneconomic damages has been held unconstitutional as applied to a personal injury plaintiff pursuing a common-law claim. Counsel handling matters in both states should not carry an instinct from one across to the other.

There is no opportunity to shape an opinion around the opposing report. An opinion that has not addressed the obvious alternative explanation will meet it for the first time in deposition, which is the worst available venue for a first encounter.

This site does not calculate any deadline. Disclosure obligations and their timing depend on the operative scheduling order, and confirming them is counsel's responsibility. The practical point is only that the expert has to be identified, conflicted and substantively engaged well before the exchange itself.